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Understanding the Risks

Why Governance Matters

Our governance proposal isn't based on speculation. Every section addresses documented risks that have played out in other cities using the same technology Overland Park is deploying. This page provides the evidence behind the framework.

1. Federal Access & Data Sharing

Federal Agencies Accessing Local Data Without Authorization

The Risk

Federal agencies can gain access to locally collected surveillance data, including license plate reader records, through multiple channels, both direct vendor partnerships and indirect requests through local police partners, without the knowledge or consent of other participating departments.

What Happened

  • In August 2025, Flock CEO Garrett Langley confirmed that Flock had run "limited pilots" directly with CBP and Homeland Security Investigations (HSI), giving federal agents direct access to its ALPR network.
  • Separately, federal agencies accessed data through "side-door" requests — asking local police partners to run searches on their behalf. In Washington state alone, the University of Washington Center for Human Rights found 17–18 police departments had their Flock data searched by federal agencies.
  • In Virginia, nearly 3,000 immigration-related searches were conducted on the statewide Flock network over a 12-month period.
  • Flock paused the federal pilots in August 2025 and announced new "Federal" user category designations.
  • The Illinois Secretary of State found Flock violated state law by allowing CBP this access.

Overland Park Relevance

OPPD uses Flock Safety LPRs and has stated it will "not share data absent a criminal nexus" with federal immigration authorities. However, Flock's national network architecture means OP data could be accessed federally without OPPD's direct knowledge or consent. This is especially relevant during the 2026 FIFA World Cup, when federal agency presence in the KC metro will be at its highest.

Section 8: Data Sharing Firewall Section 11: Parallel Access Prohibition Section 21: Guest Protocol

Flock's Default Contract Allows Broad Sharing

The Risk

Flock Safety's default contract language grants the company a license to share data for "investigative purposes" even when a local department restricts sharing.

What Happened

  • The ACLU of Massachusetts discovered that Flock's standard contract contains language permitting data sharing that overrides local department preferences.
  • 75% of Flock's law enforcement customers have reportedly enrolled in the national lookup system (a widely cited figure that has not been independently verified), making data accessible nationwide.

Overland Park Relevance

Without explicit contractual protections that override vendor defaults, OPPD's stated sharing limitations may not be legally enforceable against Flock's own data practices.

Section 6: Data Ownership Section 7: Vendor Lock-In Prevention Section 8: Data Sharing Firewall

2. Vendor Data Practices

Vendor Use of Municipal Data for AI Training

The Risk

Cloud-native surveillance vendors may use municipal data, including "anonymized" data, to train proprietary AI models, develop new products, or market to other agencies.

What Happened

This is a documented pattern across the tech industry with cloud-hosted municipal data. Axon's contract with OP includes "unlimited cloud storage," but the specific data rights and usage terms in the contract are not publicly documented. Multiple surveillance vendors have been found using municipal data for product development without explicit consent.

Overland Park Relevance

The $22.4M, 10-year Axon contract stores OP data on Axon's cloud infrastructure. Without explicit contractual prohibitions, the default in many vendor agreements permits use of "anonymized" data for improvement and development purposes.

Section 6: Data Ownership Section 6: Vendor Deletion Certification

Vendor Lock-In and Data Hostage

The Risk

Long-term contracts with proprietary data formats make it prohibitively expensive or technically impossible to switch vendors, giving the vendor disproportionate leverage in contract negotiations.

What Happened

At least 23 jurisdictions have canceled or rejected Flock contracts (Austin, Denver, Santa Cruz, Cambridge, Flagstaff, and others as of January 2026). Cities that lacked data portability provisions faced significant complications extracting their data.

Overland Park Relevance

The Axon contract is a 10-year, $22.4M commitment consolidating body cameras, LPRs, drones, Fusus, and cloud storage into a single ecosystem. This creates substantial switching costs if data portability isn't contractually guaranteed.

Section 7: Vendor Lock-In Prevention

No Vendor Deletion Verification

The Risk

When a city directs a vendor to delete data, there is typically no mechanism to verify the vendor actually did it. Cloud infrastructure commonly retains "shadow backups," disaster recovery copies, and analytics archives that may persist for years after data is "deleted" from the user-facing interface.

What Happened

This is a structural gap in cloud-based surveillance contracts nationwide. A 2023 Georgetown Law Center on Privacy & Technology report found that most municipal surveillance contracts lack deletion verification provisions. In standard cloud architecture, "deletion" often means removal from an active index while underlying storage blocks remain until overwritten, which may never happen.

Overland Park Relevance

The RTIC operates on Axon's cloud infrastructure. The city's 10-year, $22.4 million contract includes "unlimited cloud storage." Without a proof-of-deletion protocol, the city has no way to verify that data reaching its retention limit is actually destroyed rather than simply hidden from the search interface.

Section 6: Proof of Deletion Section 18: Retention & Deletion Schedule

3. Officer & Internal Misuse

Personal Misuse of Surveillance Systems

The Risk

Officers use surveillance tools for personal purposes: stalking partners, tracking personal enemies, surveilling people outside any investigation.

What Happened

  • Kechi, KS: Documented cases of officers using surveillance systems to stalk partners and harass personal enemies.
  • Nationwide pattern: Internal affairs investigations across departments consistently find officers misusing database access for personal lookups.

Overland Park Relevance

This is a Kansas-specific documented risk. Without immutable audit logs and independent review, misuse goes undetected until someone complains.

Section 17: Immutable Audit Log Section 14: Incident-Based Queries Section 4: Civilian Advisory Panel Section 23: Mandatory Discipline Referral

Custom Hot List Abuse

The Risk

Officers can create local "hot lists" of license plates that trigger real-time alerts. Without oversight, plates of political rivals, estranged partners, protestors, or other non-criminal targets can be added.

What Happened

Flock systems allow NCIC integration for stolen vehicles and wanted persons, but also permit custom local lists with no standardized criteria for inclusion. No publicly available oversight mechanism governs who gets added to OP's local hot lists or for what reason.

Overland Park Relevance

OPPD's Flock LPRs include hot list functionality. No policy governing hot list criteria is publicly available.

Section 14: Incident-Based Queries Section 17: Immutable Audit Log Section 19: Annual Transparency Report

No Personal Consequences for Misuse

The Risk

When a surveillance governance framework focuses only on system-level penalties (evidentiary exclusion, audit logging) without personal consequences for individual officers, it creates a risk calculus where the cost of violation is borne by the institution rather than the person who violated the rules.

What Happened

Documented cases of law enforcement officers using surveillance systems to track domestic partners, ex-spouses, and personal acquaintances have been reported across multiple departments. An Associated Press investigation found over 300 officers were fired or resigned over misuse of law enforcement databases from 2013–2023, but many more cases resulted in minimal consequences such as paid leave or reassignment.

Overland Park Relevance

The RTIC gives authorized users access to detailed movement data, video footage, and private camera feeds across the city. Without mandatory discipline provisions, an officer who uses the system to track a domestic partner, monitor a personal acquaintance, or conduct unauthorized searches faces only whatever consequence the department chooses to impose, which may be minimal.

Section 23: Mandatory Discipline Referral Section 23: Private Right of Action Section 23: Whistleblower Protection

4. Private Camera & Neighbor Privacy

Surveillance Without Consent ("Surveillance by Proxy")

The Risk

When businesses or homeowners integrate private cameras into the police network, everyone captured on those cameras is subject to police monitoring without consent. Tenants, neighbors, customers, and passersby have no opt-out.

What Happened

  • Fusus Community Connect recruits private cameras into police networks. Camera owners consent; people recorded do not.
  • If a landlord integrates apartment cameras via FususCORE, tenants are subject to police monitoring without consent, notification, or opt-out.
  • FususCORE hardware costs $350–$7,300 plus $150/year. Business owners set permissions (24/7, panic-button only, etc.), but the people being recorded have no say.

Overland Park Relevance

OPPD's RTIC will integrate private business and residential camera feeds through Fusus Community Connect. The network's scope is currently unknown to the public.

Section 10: Public Registry Section 12a: Field-of-View Disclosure Section 12c: Bulk Access Prohibition

Coerced Compliance with Footage Requests

The Risk

When uniformed officers request footage from businesses or residents, many feel compelled to comply, effectively bypassing warrant requirements through social pressure rather than legal process.

What Happened

This is a documented pattern across jurisdictions. The power dynamic between uniformed officers and private citizens creates de facto compulsion even when requests are technically voluntary. Some departments participate in programs (like Amazon's Ring partnerships) that automate area-wide footage requests to every camera owner in a radius.

Overland Park Relevance

Without logging and case-based requirements, the line between a voluntary request and a de facto demand is invisible.

Section 12b: Specific Logging Section 12c: Bulk Access Prohibition

5. Algorithmic & AI Risks

AI "Attribute Search" as De Facto Tracking

The Risk

Even without facial recognition, AI-powered analytics can track individuals across camera networks using physical attributes (clothing, body type, accessories), creating person-level surveillance without identifying a face.

What Happened

  • Fusus includes "Attribute Search" capability: analysts can search "red truck," "person wearing blue hoodie," or "male with backpack" across all connected cameras, tracking movements without knowing identity.
  • SmartCORE converts ordinary cameras into license plate readers.
  • Object detection identifies unattended items and weapons.

Overland Park Relevance

These are capabilities built into the Fusus platform that OPPD is deploying. The RTIC presentation does not address governance of these analytical features.

Section 3: Technology Update Trigger Section 14: Incident-Based Queries Section 15: Algorithmic Verification Rule

Algorithmic Bias in "Objective" Alerts

The Risk

If the training data used to build AI analytics contains bias, "objective" automated alerts can disproportionately target minority populations, laundering bias through the appearance of neutrality.

What Happened

  • OPPD's SOP 1170 (Non-Biased Policing) prohibits racial profiling but does not address algorithmic bias.
  • Elizabeth, NJ uses Fusus with Geolitica (formerly PredPol) for AI-powered "virtual patrols" in algorithmically-predicted crime areas, a pattern criticized for reinforcing existing enforcement disparities.

Overland Park Relevance

Fusus integrates with predictive policing tools. If OPPD activates these features or similar analytics, there is no current policy governing algorithmic bias.

Section 3: Technology Update Trigger Section 15: Algorithmic Verification Section 2: Surveillance Impact Report

Metadata Persistence After Source Deletion

The Risk

Modern surveillance platforms don't just store video; they generate searchable text descriptions, attribute tags, and movement indexes from that video. If the video is deleted on schedule but this "derived data" is retained, the system can still reconstruct a person's movements indefinitely from the AI-generated index alone.

What Happened

This is an architectural pattern common to AI-enabled surveillance platforms. Fusus and similar systems convert video into searchable metadata (e.g., "Male, blue shirt, backpack, 12:04 PM at intersection of 95th and Metcalf"). Industry-standard data retention policies typically address raw footage but are silent on derived analytics. The EFF and Surveillance Technology Oversight Project have documented this gap across multiple platforms.

Overland Park Relevance

The Axon Fusus platform powering the RTIC generates exactly this kind of derived data. Without an explicit requirement that derived data follows the same deletion schedule as source data, the 30-day LPR and 90-day video retention limits are effectively meaningless; the searchable index of your movements would persist indefinitely.

Section 0: Derived Data Definition Section 18: Derived Data Deletion Section 6: Vendor Deletion Certification

6. Facial Recognition

Facial Recognition Capability Despite Denials

The Risk

Vendors may include facial recognition capability in their platforms while publicly denying it, or the capability may be available through software updates or third-party integrations.

What Happened

  • Fusus officially claims no facial recognition capability. However, a Fusus reseller advertised "advanced analytics, such as facial recognition."
  • Columbia, MO's police chief stated the software has the capability but "wouldn't be used."
  • Third-party facial recognition can integrate through video export from any camera system.
  • Columbia, MO's City Council rejected Fusus 4-3 in 2022 after community opposition centered partly on this issue.

Overland Park Relevance

OPPD has stated it does not use facial recognition. But the Fusus platform may include or enable the capability. Without a binding prohibition, "we don't use it" can change with a software update.

Section 13: Facial Recognition Prohibition

7. Mission Creep & Scope Expansion

Quiet Expansion Through Procurement

The Risk

The surveillance network's scope expands through procurement decisions, vendor updates, and partnership agreements that never come before the public or elected officials.

What Happened

  • Flock defaults to 30-day data retention, but agencies can negotiate longer periods. San Jose retains Flock data for one full year.
  • The Axon contract includes "unlimited cloud storage" with no stated retention limits.
  • Data broker integrations (LexisNexis, Babel Street) can expand the RTIC's reach well beyond camera footage without any new authorization.
  • Officers can download images from Flock with "self-certifying affidavits," with no independent verification.

Overland Park Relevance

The $22.4M Axon contract consolidates body cameras, LPRs, drones, Fusus, and cloud storage. New capabilities can be activated through software updates without Council awareness.

Section 1: Council Authorization Section 3: Technology Update Trigger Section 9: Data Broker Limitations Section 18: Retention Schedule

Private Funding Influence on Policing Priorities

The Risk

Private corporate funding for surveillance infrastructure can create implicit obligations to prioritize the funder's locations or interests.

What Happened

  • QuikTrip provided a $500,000 grant specifically earmarked for RTIC construction.
  • Detroit's "Project Green Light" is a documented model where paying businesses receive prioritized surveillance and response.

Overland Park Relevance

The QuikTrip grant raises questions about whether acceptance creates implicit or explicit obligation to prioritize QT locations in RTIC monitoring. The full grant agreement terms are not publicly available.

Section 1: Council Authorization Section 2: Surveillance Impact Report Section 19: Annual Transparency Report

9. Effectiveness & Accountability Gaps

Overstated Effectiveness Claims

The Risk

Vendors and departments may overstate the technology's effectiveness to justify continued investment, without independent verification.

What Happened

  • Flock Safety claimed an 80% burglary reduction in San Marino. Forbes journalist Cyrus Farivar challenged this, reporting that burglaries actually slightly increased.
  • Miami RTCC (2025): Evaluation found higher case clearance but "no significant improvement in the odds of conviction."
  • RAND Chicago Study: Found 3–17% crime reductions depending on type; 5% improvement solving violent crimes, 12% for property crimes. Meaningful but modest.

Overland Park Relevance

The $22.4M investment deserves rigorous, independent measurement of outcomes, not vendor-supplied marketing metrics.

Section 1: Council Authorization Section 19: Annual Transparency Report Section 2: Surveillance Impact Report

Policy Gaps in Current Framework

The Risk

Systems launch and become operationally entrenched before governance policies are developed, making meaningful oversight much harder to implement after the fact.

What Happened

OPPD maintains SOPs for body cameras (SOP 2160) and non-biased policing (SOP 1170), but no policies exist for: Fusus analytical tools, ALPR hot list criteria, drone deployment protocols, AI use, or RTIC operational governance.

Chief Jokerst has stated these policies are "being crafted" but no timelines or public review processes have been announced. The RTIC is scheduled to launch April 2026.

Overland Park Relevance

This is the core timing argument. Governance should be built alongside capability, not bolted on afterward.

The entire framework

Indefinite Retention Through Open Cases

The Risk

If investigation data is retained for "the duration of the case plus one year" with no maximum, data can be kept indefinitely by flagging it to open or cold cases. A generic "suspicious activity" report could preserve thousands of hours of footage with no expiration.

What Happened

This is a documented pattern in jurisdictions with case-based retention policies but no retention ceiling. The Brennan Center for Justice has noted that "case duration" retention without a cap effectively creates indefinite storage for any data a department wants to keep, since cases can remain technically "open" for decades.

Overland Park Relevance

The RTIC will generate large volumes of data daily. Without a retention ceiling, the volume of "flagged" data could grow indefinitely, creating an ever-expanding archive of resident movements and activities attached to investigations that may never be resolved.

Section 18: Retention Ceiling (3/7 years)
SOURCES

Sources & Research

Federal Access & Data Sharing
404 Media
4,000+ lookups by local police on behalf of ICE using Flock's nationwide ALPR database.
PBS NewsHour / Associated Press
AP investigation revealing CBP uses predictive algorithms on license plate data to flag drivers nationwide.
UW Center for Human Rights
Documents "front door," "back door," and "side door" federal access to local Flock camera data.
404 Media
Flock blocks California, Illinois, Virginia from national lookup after abuse: evidence the system was being exploited.
Vendor Practices & Private Surveillance
404 Media
Leaked audio: Flock building "Nova" product to let police "jump from LPR to person" using data brokers.
404 Media
Retail stores feeding Flock camera data to law enforcement through national surveillance network.
KPBS Public Media
Single department can access 50,000+ cameras nationwide. Malls, HOAs, and businesses sharing feeds with police.
Officer & Database Misuse
Associated Press (via CBS News)
AP investigation: 325+ officers fired, suspended, or resigned for database misuse (2013–2015). Stalking, harassment, vendettas.
Electronic Frontier Foundation
EFF analysis confirming misuse cases doubled in California between 2010–2015. Systemic lack of oversight.
Data Retention & Derived Data
Brennan Center for Justice
Documents Flock's 30-day retention and how users can retain data indefinitely. Maps vendor data practices across devices.
Brennan Center for Justice
Indefinite retention enabled by decreasing storage costs. Constitutional limits on law enforcement access.
Brennan Center for Justice
Comprehensive research hub on police surveillance technologies, risks, and oversight frameworks.
Legal Foundations
Cornell Law Institute
Landmark Supreme Court ruling: government needs a warrant for cell-site location data. Establishes privacy expectations for digital tracking.
Supreme Court of the United States
Full text of the 5–4 decision authored by Chief Justice Roberts.
City Framework Precedents
City of Oakland Municipal Code
Full text of Oakland's surveillance ordinance — model for private right of action (§9.64.050).
Electronic Frontier Foundation
EFF analysis of why Oakland's ordinance sets the bar for civilian oversight of police surveillance.
Berkeley Law — Samuelson Clinic
Comprehensive survey of 16 surveillance oversight ordinances. Analyzes enforcement mechanisms and private right of action.
ACLU of Massachusetts
The CCOPS model bill and organizing resources. Now passed in 24+ jurisdictions nationwide.
Electronic Frontier Foundation
EFF's analysis of what works, what doesn't, and why private right of action matters in oversight ordinances.
Restore the Fourth
Structural overview of the national surveillance ordinance movement.
Community Tools
DeFlock / OpenStreetMap
Map and report ALPR cameras in your area. Community-sourced, open source, privacy-first.
Electronic Frontier Foundation
EFF's database tracking surveillance technology deployments by police departments across the U.S.
ALPR.watch
Tracks upcoming public meetings with surveillance-related agenda items. Email alerts for meetings near you.
Oakland Privacy Coalition
Citizens' coalition behind Oakland's Privacy Advisory Commission. Model policies and research resources.
StopFlock.com
Consolidated resource on Flock's surveillance network with links to research, advocacy, and community organizing.
HaveIBeenFlocked.com
Searchable database of FOIA audit logs from Flock camera networks across the country.